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Abstract This paper examines the consequences of specification error when transi-
tion matrices are used to analyse patterns of intergenerational mobility. We show
that classical measurement error in both the child’s and parent’s earnings can lead to
biased results, with summary mobility measures biased by as much as 20% in some
cases. Furthermore our results suggest that the extent of the bias is most severe in
the tails of the distribution. Omitted conditioning variables appear to have a modest
effect on transition matrices in our model.
Key words transition matrices · specification error · intergenerational mobility.
1 Introduction
Recent work has highlighted a number of problems that arise when estimating
and interpreting models of income mobility. Many of these problems relate to
mismeasured or unobserved variables. For example, measurement error can occur
if reported income is not an accurate measure of actual income. This problem may
be compounded in models of intergenerational mobility if researchers have access
to only 1 or 2 years of individual earnings, when the relevant economic variable
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is lifetime earnings. Several authors have discussed measurement error bias in the
context of linear regression models of intergenerational mobility (e.g., Solon [30],
Zimmerman [33], Abul Naga [1] and Minicozzi [23]). Much of this work has tended
to emphasise measurement error in fathers’ earnings, presumably because classical
measurement error in sons’ earnings does not bias the OLS estimator. However, if
the error process deviates from the textbook model then measurement error in sons’
earnings may also be relevant (Jenkins [20], Grawe [16] and Haider and Solon [18]).
Omitted variable bias, on the other hand, occurs when unobserved characteristics
that are inherited from parents, such as ability, are also correlated with earnings.
The OLS estimator mistakenly attributes the variation in earnings due to inherited
endowments directly to parental earnings, leading us to overestimate the causal effect
of parental earnings on children’s earnings.
While the simple linear regression model provides a useful summary of the
conditional mean function, it is only a partial description of the joint distribution
of earnings. When considering intergenerational mobility patterns throughout the
distribution, researchers have traditionally moved away from regression based mod-
els and relied instead upon transition matrices (Zimmerman [33], Dearden et al.
[12]). However, there has been little emphasis on the consequences of specifica-
tion error when this approach is adopted. For instance in an influential paper on
intergenerational mobility, Zimmerman [33] uses a number of procedures to correct
for potential biases in the linear regression model. However, when presenting his
transition matrices he notes that “ these [transition matrices] are not adjusted for
measurement error, [which] could seriously alter the grouping.” He goes on to warn
that “[the transition matrices] should be interpreted with caution.” In this paper we
use a simulated model of intergenerational mobility to examine the consequences
of measurement error and omitted variables on transition matrices. Although our
focus is on intergenerational mobility the same issues arise when looking at individual
earnings mobility across the life-cycle or country mobility over time and our findings
are also relevant to these areas. We show that the intuition derived under the linear
regression model should not be transposed to analyses based on transition matrices.
Classical measurement error in both initial (parent’s) earnings and final (son’s)
earnings matters when looking at the joint distribution. These errors may distort
mobility patterns in the underlying model, making it more difficult for researchers
to interpret their findings. In addition we show that variation in intergenerational
mobility indices across countries could be explained by differences in data reliability
rather than differences in the underlying structural model. For the parameter values
we choose, omitted conditioning variables appear to have a relatively small effect on
transition matrices.
2 Intergenerational mobility model
In this section we present the model of intergenerational mobility that we use
throughout the paper. A son’s log earnings (y∗t ) is determined by parental log
earnings (y∗t−1), endowments (bt), which are partially inherited from parents, and
market luck (eyt ). Both y∗t and y∗t−1 are expressed as deviations from their means. We
denote the stationary variance of earnings by σ 2y∗ . Following Grawe and Mulligan
[17] we consider endowments as the human capital that a son receives automatically
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from the parent without regard for incentives. These may include genes, reputation,
culture, motivation or tastes. Formally,
y∗t = βy∗t−1 + γ bt + eyt , (1)
bt = ρbt−1 + ebt , (2)
where eyt and ebt are iid random variables with normal distributions, mean zero and
variance σ 2ey and σ
2
eb respectively. The relationship between a son’s endowment and
his father’s endowment is given by Eq. 2; ρ represents the degree of inheritability
of endowments. Assuming particular distributions for the stochastic components is
simply a convenience which allows us to obtain analytic solutions for this model.
More general distributional assumptions could be incorporated into our model using
Monte Carlo methods. Nevertheless, we believe that the model we present is rich
enough to highlight the pitfalls arising from specification error in transition models.
This model can be viewed as a simple mechanical model of intergenerational
transfers; however it is also a special case of the model introduced by Becker
and Tomes [3]. In their model parents spend resources on their own consumption,
financial transfers to the child and investments in the human capital of the child.
Parents are altruistic and care about their own consumption and their children’s
consumption. In the absence of credit constraints all children receive the efficient
level of human capital, which depends on bt. In this case the intergenerational
dynamics of earnings depends only on the intergenerational dynamics of endow-
ments (given by ρ) and β is equal to 0. If credit constraints exist some parents
are unable to fund the efficient level of human capital. Holding bt constant the
constraint becomes less binding as income rises, so that parents with higher incomes
invest more in their children and β is greater than 0. In general the magnitude of
β varies across borrowing constrained families, however it is constant within this
group when preferences are Cobb–Douglas.1 Therefore the model outlined in Eqs. 1
and 2 describes the intergenerational earnings dynamics for a population in which
every household is credit constrained and preferences are Cobb–Douglas. While this
model is somewhat restrictive, it is used in many studies of intergenerational mobility
and provides a useful starting point from which to evaluate the consequences of
specification error.
Although β determines the conditional mean function of the data generating
process it only provides a partial description of mobility patterns. As a result
researchers have supplemented estimates of β with transition matrices that provide
a discrete summary of the distribution of sons’ earnings conditional on fathers’
earnings (Atkinson et al. [2], Zimmerman [33]). In contrast to the linear regression
model, relatively little is known about the consequences of specification errors for
estimated transition matrices. As far as we are aware there are no analytical results
concerning the effects of measurement error or omitted variables for transition
probabilities. There are some papers that try to account for measurement error when
1For a detailed analysis of the role of heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility models see Han
and Mulligan [19].
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measuring transitions in the labour market; for example Magnac and Visser [22] and
Poterba and Summers [27, 28] use auxiliary information on error rates to estimate
transitions between labour market states and Breen and Moisio [8] use latent class
Markov models to correct for measurement error in estimating poverty transitions.
The former require auxiliary data from which the truth can be ascertained, the latter
requires observations on multiple transitions to identify the measurement error;
these data are unlikely to be available in studies of intergenerational mobility. Other
papers have used average income to control for measurement error when estimating
intergenerational transition matrices (e.g., Corak and Heisz [11] and Blanden [4]).
The typical time span used in this work is 2 to 5 years. However, Mazumder [24]
notes that one may need to average data over a longer period to achieve reliable
estimates.
In this paper we use the model given in Eqs. 1 and 2 to examine the consequences
of specification error for transition matrices. We look at the impact of measurement
error in both parents’ and children’s earnings, as well as the consequences of omitted
variables. We show that knowledge of the effect of specification error on β is not
sufficient to determine the effect on transition probabilities. The paper involves no
new estimation; rather we calibrate the above model using a range of estimates
available from recent studies of intergenerational mobility. We use this calibrated
model to examine the effects of specification error.2 The next sections outline the
key features of the model for the types of specification error considered.
2.1 Measurement error in sons’ earnings
When considering measurement error we focus on the following model :
y∗t = λy∗t−1 + eyt . (3)
This specification is in keeping with most empirical studies that do not control for
endowments, b , when measuring intergenerational mobility. In this case λ is some
combination of β and γ .3
Due to measurement error in the son’s earnings we cannot observe y∗t . Instead we
observe yt which is defined as:
yt = y∗t + u. (4)
We assume that u is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2u . We
report results with and without correlation between u and y∗t , which we denote
by ρy∗t u. For the former case we choose ρy∗t u= −0.17.4 O’Neill et al. [25] derive
2This approach is similar to that adopted by Kim and Solon [21] when examining the implications of
mean-reverting measurement error in longitudinal studies of wages and employment.
3In the event that γ = 0 in Eq. 1 then λ ≡ β.
4This value is consistent with the findings of Bound et al. [5] who examine the extent to which
current reported earnings differs from current actual earnings. In a life-cycle model, such as the
one presented by Haider and Solon [18], a correlation of −0.17 occurs when sons are approximately
35 years of age.
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theoretical results for correlated measurement error in distributional analysis by
considering transformations of the joint density fy∗t u(yt, u). We follow a similar
approach when introducing correlated measurement error into our model, in that
we consider transformations of the joint density conditional on parental earnings,
fy∗t uy∗t−1(yt, u|y0t−1). This is equivalent to specifying the correlation between y∗t and u
by considering only correlation between eyt and u. We discuss the implications of this
in more detail in Section 3.1.
A key parameter in measurement error models is the “reliability ratio”, defined as
s = Cov(yt,y∗t )Var(yt) . In the textbook model with classical measurement error this simplifies
to the familiar signal to noise ratio,
σ 2y∗
σ 2y∗+σ 2u
. We experiment with two values of the
reliability ratio (s) : 0.5 and 0.75. These are within the range of estimates presented in
recent studies of intergenerational mobility (Zimmerman [33] and Mazumder [24]).
In our simulations we choose the variance of y∗t (σ 2y∗) and the variance of u (σ 2u ) to
be consistent with our chosen reliability ratio and our estimate of the variance of
observed earnings, σ 2y . Throughout the paper we set σ
2
y = 0.3 (see Zimmerman [33]).
To examine the robustness of our results we use two different values of λ: 0.5 and
0.3.5
Under our assumptions we can determine both the true density, fy∗t y∗t−1
(
yt | y0t−1
)
,
and the misspecified density, fyt y∗t−1
(
yt | y0t−1
)
, as follows:
Proposition 1
(a) y∗t | y∗t−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
(
λy0t−1,
(
1 − λ2) σ 2y∗
)
.
(b) yt | y∗t−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
(
λy0t−1,
((
1 − λ2) σ 2y∗ + σ 2u + 2ρy∗uσy∗σu
))
.
Proof See Appendix 1. 
Although the conditional means of both distributions are the same, the conditional
variances differ. If eyt and u are uncorrelated, the variance of the misspecified
distribution is larger than the variance of the true distribution. Negative correlation
between eyt and u can partially offset this effect. This has implications for estimating
mobility which we discuss later.
2.2 Measurement error in fathers’ earnings
When considering the consequences of measurement error in the father’s earnings
we first assume that the true value of the son’s earnings y∗t , is observed. We specify
the observed value of the father’s earnings as:
yt−1 = y∗t−1 + v. (5)
We assume that v is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2v . We
allow for the possibility that v and y∗t−1 are correlated, with correlation denoted
5This is consistent with the range of intergenerational elasticities reported in the literature, the
majority of which are obtained by regressing the child’s earnings on the parent’s earnings alone.
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by ρy∗t−1v , but assume that v and y
∗
t are uncorrelated. Under these assumptions the
misspecified density, fy∗t yt−1(yt | y0t−1) can de derived from the following Proposition:
Proposition 2
y∗t | yt−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
(
λy0t−1
σ 2y∗
σ 2yt−1
, σ 2y∗
(
1 − λ2 σ
2
y∗
σ 2yt−1
))
.
Proof See Appendix 1. 
In this case both the mean and the variance are biased. The direction of the
biases depend on whether
σ 2y∗
σ 2yt−1
 1. Since σ 2yt−1 = σ 2y∗t−1 + σ 2v + 2ρy∗vσy∗σv ,
σ 2y∗
σ 2yt−1
is
less than 1 whenever ρy∗t−1v is greater than 0. In this case the conditional mean is
biased downwards and the conditional variance is biased upwards. However if ρy∗v
is sufficiently negative, then
σ 2y∗
σ 2yt−1
can exceed 1, in which case measurement error in
fathers’ earnings would lead to an amplification bias in the conditional mean6 and an
attenuation bias in the conditional variance.
2.3 Simultaneous measurement error in fathers’ and sons’ earnings
We also consider simultaneous measurement error in both fathers’ and sons’ earn-
ings. In this case the model is specified as :
y∗t = λy∗t−1 + eyt , (6)
yt = y∗t + u, (7)
yt−1 = y∗t−1 + v. (8)
In this section we assume that both u and v are normally distributed with mean
0 and variance σ 2. As before we conduct the analysis with two values of s, 0.5 and
0.75.7 To the best of our knowledge there have been no studies that have quantified
the correlation between the errors in sons’ and fathers’ earnings. However results
presented in Grawe [16] and Haider and Solon [18] would lead one to suspect
positive correlation in intergenerational data. This is because fathers who are older
than average in these samples tend to have sons who are older than average. We
simulate the results for three different values of ρuv; ρuv = 0, ρuv = 0.4, ρuv = 0.8.
6For a related discussion see Haider and Solon [18]. However they only focus on bias in the
conditional mean function.
7In this analysis we choose the same reliability ratio for fathers’ and sons’ earnings. The analysis can
be easily extended to allow these to differ.
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When considering simultaneous measurement error we assume that u and v are
uncorrelated with y∗t and y∗t−1. Under these assumptions it is easy to show that:
Proposition 3
yt | yt−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
⎛
⎜
⎝
[
λ
σ 2y∗
σ 2y∗ + σ 2
+ σuv
σ 2y∗ + σ 2
]
y0t−1,
⎡
⎢
⎣σ 2y∗ + σ 2 −
(
λσ 2y∗ + σuv
)2
σ 2y∗ + σ 2
⎤
⎥
⎦
⎞
⎟
⎠.
Proof See Appendix 1. 
In this case the traditional downward bias in the conditional mean is offset by
positive correlation between u and v; the conditional variance may be under or
overestimated depending on the parameters of the model.
2.4 Omitted endowments
To study the influence of omitted endowments we have to consider the complete
intergenerational model, given by Eqs. 1 and 2. Appendix 2 contains the solution
for this model. In our simulations we report results for two sets of parameters; β =
γ = 0.5 and β = γ = 0.3. Given the absence of information on σ 2b we assume σ 2b =
σ 2y∗ . We fix ρ = 0.5. While there is some controversy over the size of ρ, this value is
consistent with the estimates reported by Goldberger [14].
3 Evaluating the consequences of misspecification for the measurement of mobility
In order to quantify the impact of specification error we need to use the distributions
given in Section 2 to construct a measure of mobility. However, there is no consensus
on how best to measure mobility. Fields and Ok [13] suggest that this may be because
the meaning of income mobility is not well defined, with different studies focusing
on different aspects of mobility. Three types of mobility are distinguished in the
literature: absolute mobility, relative mobility and positional mobility.8 Absolute
mobility measures are invariant to the addition of the same positive constant to
both fathers’ and sons’ earnings and thus value movement per se. Relative mobility
focuses on measures that are invariant to the multiplication of fathers’ and sons’
earnings by positive constants; in linear regression models this is captured by the
notion of regression to the mean. In this paper we focus on transition matrices.
They are associated with a third class of mobility measures; positional or ordinal
measures of mobility. Such measures are invariant to any monotonic transformation
of the data. We follow the approach typically adopted in empirical work and define
earnings classes based on quartiles of the marginal earnings distribution. Denote the
ith quartile in the observed earnings distribution of sons and fathers by QSi and Q
F
i
8For a recent comparison of these approaches in the context of intergenerational mobility see
Checchi and Dardanoni [9].
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respectively, where i = 1, 2, 3 and define QS0 = QF0 = −∞ and QS4 = QF4 = ∞. The
(i, j)th element of the transition matrix is defined as:
pij = Pr
(
QSi−1 ≤ zt < QSi
∣∣QFj−1 ≤ zt−1 < QFj
)
,
where zt = yt or y∗t and zt−1 = yt−1 or y∗t−1.
Transition matrices can be used to construct several summary measures of posi-
tional mobility (Shorrocks [29]). We report the Immobility Ratio, the Bartholomew
Index and a measure based on the second largest eigenvalue of the transition matrix.
We define the Immobility Ratio as the average of the diagonal elements of the
transition matrix. Formally,
IM = 1
n
n∑
i=1
pii,
where n is the number of classes.
The Bartholomew Index weights each class transition by the number of bound-
aries that have been crossed. In particular:
B = 1
n − 1
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pij|i − j|,
The final measure is based on the second largest eigenvalue of the transition
matrix (EV2) and is given by:
L = 1 − |EV2|.
This measure captures the speed of convergence of a Markov chain towards its
equilibrium distribution. As noted by Shorrocks [29] a rigid structure is associated
with a slowly changing distribution such that EV2 will be close to 1; a perfectly mobile
structure establishes the equilibrium distribution within a single period (EV2 = 0).
3.1 Measurement error in sons’ earnings
When looking at measurement error in sons’ earnings we first consider the case
where λ = 0.5. Our results are given in Tables I and II. Table I presents the transition
matrices and Table II provides the aggregate mobility measures. We report the
results for our two chosen values of the reliability ratio. Our value of s = 0.5 is
equal to Mazumder’s [24] reported reliability ratio when a single year’s earnings is
used to proxy for life-time earnings; s = 0.75 corresponds to a three-year average of
earnings.9 Comparing the results for these two values allows us to evaluate the effect
of time-averaging on transition matrices.
The transition matrices presented in Table I are consistent with previous empirical
work. The estimated matrix with classical measurement error and s = 0.5 is very
similar to that reported by Zimmerman [33] who uses a single year’s earnings to
proxy life-time earnings. As noted earlier Zimmerman [33] expressed a concern
that measurement error might have seriously distorted his estimated transition
9See the first column of results in Table I of Mazumder [24].
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Table I Quartile group transition matrices under alternative error structures for sons (λ = 0.5)
No error
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.481 0.278 0.168 0.072
0.278 0.296 0.258 0.168
0.168 0.258 0.296 0.278
0.072 0.168 0.278 0.481
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Classical error
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
0.406 0.275 0.200 0.118
0.275 0.273 0.251 0.200
0.200 0.251 0.273 0.275
0.118 0.200 0.275 0.406
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
0.446 0.278 0.184 0.093
0.278 0.284 0.254 0.184
0.184 0.254 0.284 0.278
0.093 0.184 0.278 0.446
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
Correlated error
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.423 0.277 0.193 0.107
0.277 0.278 0.252 0.193
0.193 0.252 0.278 0.277
0.107 0.193 0.277 0.423
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.459 0.278 0.178 0.085
0.278 0.288 0.256 0.178
0.178 0.256 0.288 0.278
0.085 0.178 0.278 0.459
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
matrices. We can gauge the magnitude of these biases by comparing the misspecified
transition matrix to the true matrix. The results show that classical measurement
error in sons’ earnings leads us to overestimate mobility, particularly in the tails of
the distribution. In the presence of classical measurement error we estimate that
approximately 40.6% of sons born to fathers in the lowest quartile remain in the
lowest quartile (Zimmerman’s estimate was 41%). However, when we look at the
true data generating process we see that the true proportion is 48%. The bias tends
to be smaller in the middle of the distribution where the classical measurement error
causes the proportion of stayers to fall from 29.6% to 27.3%. Therefore, not only
does classical measurement error in son’s earnings lead to an upward bias in mobility,
Table II Aggregate mobility measures under alternative error structures in sons’ earnings (λ = 0.5)
Reliability ratio =0.5 Reliability ratio=0.75
IM B L IM B L
No error 0.388 0.284 0.561 0.388 0.284 0.561
Classical error 0.340 0.326 0.692 0.365 0.304 0.622
Non-classical error 0.350 0.317 0.662 0.373 0.297 0.599
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it also distorts mobility patterns in the underlying process. Changing the reliability
ratio from 0.5 to 0.75 halves the estimated bias.
The last two transition matrices in Table I examine the effect of non-classical mea-
surement error on mobility. Given our parameter values, the negative correlation
between y∗t and u helps offset the bias from classical measurement error. We can
draw some parallels between this finding and the established results for measurement
error in the linear regression model. It is well known (e.g., Bound et al. [6]) that
the OLS estimator of the slope coefficient remains unbiased when there is classical
measurement error in the dependent variable. However, introducing a correlation
between the error and the true value can cause a bias, with larger correlations
leading to larger biases. This is because the correlation between y∗t and u in the
linear regression model is generated through the explanatory variables.10 However,
we can also consider generating correlation between u and y∗t through the stochastic
term. Correlation of this type does not bias the OLS estimator since the new error
term is still uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. However, O’Neill et al. [25]
show that correlation of this type does matter for researchers interested in the entire
distribution rather than just the mean. This is reflected in the results presented in
the last two matrices of Table I. These results are consistent with Pischke [26]. He
uses the PSID validation data to argue that a model which generates measurement
error via transitory earnings fluctuations fits the data well. In this case correlation
attenuates the role of white noise measurement error in models of earnings dynamics.
Table II summarises these transition matrices using the aggregate measures of
mobility presented earlier. As expected, the results show that classical measurement
error in the son’s earnings leads us to overestimate mobility; the Immobility Ratio
falls and the Bartholomew Index and eigenvalue measure rise.11 We can use these
results to understand the extent to which measurement error may distort our ability
to understand the world around us. For instance the Immobility Ratio falls by
approximately five percentage points with classical measurement error. Blanden [4]
reports transition matrices for the UK, the US, Germany and Canada from which we
can calculate the following immobility ratios; 0.34 (UK), 0.344(US), 0.374 (Germany)
and 0.30 (Canada).12 Our findings show that with the exception of the comparison
between Germany and Canada, all the other differences could potentially be at-
tributed to differences in data reliability across countries. The differences in data
reliability across countries need not reflect measurement error per se. In countries
with a lot of intragenerational mobility, current earnings will be a less reliable proxy
for lifetime earnings. Our results in turn suggest that the corresponding estimates
of intergenerational mobility will be too high in these countries. As longer panel
data sets become available it will be possible to test whether these differences in
10See for example the discussion in Bound et al. [5].
11The results discussed in this section use a value of λ = 0.5. Results when λ = 0.3 are given in the
Appendix 3 (Tables A1, A2). Qualitatively the biases are the same as those discussed in the paper
though the magnitude of the bias declines as λ falls.
12These estimates are based on father’s and son’s earnings averaged over 2 years but are similar to
other estimates (e.g., Corak and Heisz [10]).
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intragenerational mobility can account for reported differences in intergenerational
mobility.13
3.2 Measurement error in fathers’ earnings
In this section we assume that the error process for fathers’ earnings is similar to
the one used when analysing measurement error in sons’ earnings. In particular the
values chosen for σ 2v and ρy∗t−1v are the same as those used for σ
2
u and ρy∗t u. Combined
with our assumption of stationary this implies the following symmetry condition14
fyt y∗t−1 (x, z) = fy∗t yt−1 (z, x) .
This in turn implies that the impact of measurement error in the father’s earnings
on transition matrices is identical to the impact of measurement error in the son’s
earnings. Formally15
fy∗t yt−1
(
QS∗i−1 ≤ y∗t ≤ QS∗i
∣∣QFj−1 ≤ yt−1 ≤ QFj−1
)
= fyt y∗t−1
(
QSi−1 ≤ yt ≤ QSi
∣∣QF∗j−1 ≤ y∗t−1 ≤ QF∗j
)
. (9)
3.3 Simultaneous measurement error in fathers’ and sons’ earnings
The results when both fathers’ and sons’ earnings are measured with error are given
in Tables III and IV. We consider three values for the correlation between fathers’
and sons’ errors (ρuv = 0, ρuv = 0.4, ρuv = 0.8 ). When the errors are uncorrelated
mobility rises at each quartile group of the distribution. However, if the correlation
is sufficiently large mobility in the observed data is too low. As in the previous
sections we see that measurement error also distorts mobility patterns within the
transition matrix and again the nature of these distortions depends on the error
process. Consider the results when s = 0.5. The proportion of sons remaining in
the lowest quartile group of the earnings distribution falls from 0.481 to 0.357 when
ρuv = 0 ; the decline in the middle is much smaller (0.296 to 0.263). However, when
ρuv = 0.8, the proportion of sons remaining in the lowest quartile group of the
earnings distribution rises from 0.481 in the true distribution to 0.569 in the observed
distribution; the increase in the middle is smaller, 0.296 to 0.334. These results may
have important implications for researchers interested in making inferences based
on mobility patterns within transition matrices. For instance Bowles and Gintis [7]
13While the specification used throughout this section is consistent with most of the empirical work
in this area we have also examined the impact of measurement error using the full model given by
Eqs. 1 and 2. Following Grawe and Mulligan [17] we consider a situation where credit constraints are
relatively unimportant so that all of the intergenerational earnings correlation is due to endowment
transmissions. In particular we choose β=0.1 and γ =0.4. As before classical measurement error
increases mobility. However the magnitude of the biases are smaller than those reported in Table II.
This is because of the relatively small size of β.
14This can be easily seen from the expressions for the joint distributions given in 1.
15For proof see Appendix 4.
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Table III Quartile Group Transition Matrices with simultaneous measurement error in fathers’ and
sons’ earnings (λ = 0.5)
No error⎡
⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
0.481 0.278 0.168 0.072
0.278 0.296 0.258 0.168
0.168 0.258 0.296 0.278
0.072 0.168 0.278 0.481
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
Simultaneous noncorrelated error (ρuv = 0)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.357 0.270 0.218 0.155
0.270 0.263 0.249 0.218
0.218 0.245 0.263 0.270
0.155 0.218 0.270 0.357
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio(s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.417 0.276 0.196 0.111
0.276 0.276 0.252 0.196
0.196 0.252 0.276 0.276
0.111 0.196 0.276 0.417
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Simultaneous correlated error (ρuv = 0.4)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.454 0.278 0.180 0.087
0.278 0.287 0.255 0.180
0.180 0.255 0.287 0.278
0.087 0.180 0.278 0.454
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio(s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.468 0.278 0.174 0.079
0.278 0.291 0.256 0.174
0.174 0.256 0.291 0.278
0.079 0.174 0.278 0.468
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Simultaneous correlated error (ρuv = 0.8)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.569 0.274 0.125 0.032
0.274 0.334 0.267 0.125
0.125 0.267 0.334 0.274
0.032 0.125 0.274 0.569
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.523 0.277 0.148 0.051
0.277 0.312 0.262 0.148
0.148 0.262 0.312 0.277
0.051 0.148 0.277 0.523
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Table IV Aggregate mobility measures for simultaneous measurement error (λ = 0.5)
Reliability ratio=0.5 Reliability ratio= 0.75
IM B L IM B L
No error 0.388 0.284 0.561 0.388 0.284 0.561
ρuv = 0 0.31 0.354 0.784 0.346 0.320 0.674
ρuv = 0.4 0.371 0.299 0.606 0.379 0.292 0.584
ρuv = 0.8 0.452 0.235 0.420 0.418 0.261 0.492
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Table V Quartile Group Transition Matrices for omitted variables (β =0.5, γ =0.5, ρ=0.5)
Truth, conditional⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.558 0.275 0.131 0.036
0.275 0.328 0.266 0.131
0.131 0.266 0.328 0.275
0.036 0.131 0.275 0.558
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Misspecified, unconditional⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.580 0.272 0.119 0.029
0.272 0.340 0.268 0.119
0.119 0.268 0.340 0.272
0.029 0.119 0.272 0.580
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
use intergenerational transition probabilities to suggest that “distinct mechanisms
may be at work at various points of the income distribution.” Our results show that
measurement error makes it difficult to identify whether or not such differences exist.
Table IV reports the aggregate mobility measures based on these matrices. As
expected the impact of simultaneous measurement error is much larger than that
discussed in Section 3.1. When both sons’ and fathers’ earnings are measured with
error, and this error is uncorrelated, the Immobility Ratio falls by over 20%.
When ρuv = 0.8 the Immobility Ratio rises by over 15%. The range of Immobility
Ratios generated by these error processes now incorporates almost all the ratios
derived from Blanden [4]. Thus, these cross-country differences could simply reflect
differences in data reliability rather than structural differences.16
3.4 Omitted endowments
Tables V and VI report the effects of omitted endowments when β = γ = ρ = 0.5.17
To identify the true causal effect of a father’s earnings on his son’s earnings we need
to control for the transmission of endowments across generations. We do this by
estimating transition matrices conditional on a specific value of the endowment.18
The misspecified model is likely to underestimate mobility, since it incorrectly
attributes the effect of endowments to earnings. Comparing the transition matrices
conditional on endowments with the misspecified model allows us to determine the
magnitude of this bias. Given our distributional assumptions and the assumption of
stationarity, the true transition matrices are identical for all endowment levels.19
The results presented in Table V show that, as expected, the misspecified model
underestimates mobility, however the magnitude of the bias is relatively small. The
proportion of sons staying in the lowest quartile group rises from 0.56 to 0.58.
The aggregate summary measures are reported in Table VI. The Immobility Ratio
16For further discussion of the differences in intergenerational mobility rates across countries see
Solon [31, 32].
17Appendix 3 (Tables A3, A4) presents the simulation results when β = γ = 0.3 and ρ = 0.5.
18This is analagous to including measures of ability in linear regression models.
19It is important to emphasise that this is a feature of using transition matrices to measure mobility.
The underlying distributions are not the same.
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Table VI Aggregate mobility measures for omitted variables ( β = 0.5, γ =0.5, ρ=0.5)
IM B L
True, conditional model 0.443 0.241 0.457
Misspecified, unconditional model 0.460 0.229 0.404
increases slightly from 0.443 to 0.46 when we fail to account for endowments. This is
a relatively small bias compared to those reported earlier for measurement error.20
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the consequences of measurement error and omitted
endowments on intergenerational transition matrices. We find that classical mea-
surement error in the child’s earnings leads us to overestimate mobility. This is in
contrast to OLS, where estimates of the intergenerational earnings elasticity remain
unbiased in the presence of classical measurement error in children’s earnings. We
also show how, in contrast to the linear regression model, negative correlation
between the truth and the measurement error, may reduce the bias. The magnitude
of the bias arising from measurement error is substantial when compared to the bias
arising from omitted variables, particularly when we allow for measurement error in
both sons’ and fathers’ earnings. We show that, by changing the error process, it is
possible to generate a range of mobility measures consistent with those reported in
previous empirical work. This raises the possibility that cross-country differences in
mobility measures may reflect differences in data reliability rather than differences
in the underlying structural model. In addition we show that measurement error
affects not only the degree of mobility but also the pattern of mobility throughout
the distribution. This finding has important implications for researchers who use
differences in mobility patterns within transition matrices to make statements about
the underlying model.
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Appendix 1: Proofs of results in Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1
(a)
[
y∗t
y∗t−1
]
∼ N
[[
0
0
]
,
∑
1
]
where
∑
1
=
[
σ 2y∗ λσ
2
y∗
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗
]
.
20We have also examined the use of a proxy variable in place of the true ability variable and found
that, as expected, the use of the proxy reduces the size of the bias. However given the relatively small
size of the bias to begin with, we do not report these results. Details are available from the authors
upon request.
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Applying the results for conditional normal distributions we can establish that
y∗t | y∗t−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
(
λy0t−1,
(
1 − λ2) σ 2y∗
)
.
(b) Under our assumptions
⎡
⎣
y∗t
y∗t−1
u
⎤
⎦ ∼ N
⎡
⎣
⎡
⎣
0
0
0
⎤
⎦ ,
∑
2
⎤
⎦ where
∑
2
=
⎡
⎢
⎣
σ 2y∗ λσ
2
y∗ σy∗t u
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗ 0
σy∗t u 0 σ 2u
⎤
⎥
⎦ .
Since any linear combination of trivariate normal random variables is also nor-
mally distributed, this implies that yt (= y∗t + u) and y∗t−1are normally distributed.
Under our assumptions the distribution fyt y∗t−1 is determined by:
[
yt
y∗t−1
]
∼ N
[[
0
0
]
,
∑
3
]
where
∑
3
=
[
σ 2y∗ + σ 2u + 2σy∗t u λσ 2y∗
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗
]
.
Applying the results for conditional normal distributions we can establish that
yt | y∗t−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
⎛
⎜
⎝λy0t−1,
⎛
⎜
⎝1 −
λ2
(
σ 2y∗
)2
(
σ 2y∗ + σ 2u + 2σy∗t u
)
σ 2y∗
⎞
⎟
⎠
(
σ 2y∗ + σ 2u + 2σy∗t u
)
⎞
⎟
⎠ ,
yt | y∗t−1 = y0t−1 ∼ N
(
λy0t−1,
((
1 − λ2
)
σ 2y∗ + σ 2u + 2σy∗t u
))
.
The result in Proposition 1 (b) follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Under our assumptions
⎡
⎣
y∗t
y∗t−1
v
⎤
⎦ ∼ N
⎡
⎣
⎡
⎣
0
0
0
⎤
⎦ ,
∑
4
⎤
⎦ where
∑
4
=
⎡
⎢
⎣
σ 2y∗ λσ
2
y∗ 0
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗ σy∗t−1,v
0 σy∗t−1,v σ
2
v
⎤
⎥
⎦ .
Since any linear combination of trivariate normal random variables is also nor-
mally distributed, this implies that y∗t and yt−1(= y∗t−1 + v) are normally distributed.
Under our assumptions the distribution fy∗t yt−1 is given by:
[
y∗t
yt−1
]
∼ N
[[
0
0
]
,
∑
5
]
where
∑
5
=
[
σ 2y∗ λσ
2
y∗
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗ + σ 2v + 2σy∗t−1,v
]
.
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Applying the results for conditional normal distributions we can establish that
y∗t | yt−1 ∼ N
⎛
⎝λ
σ 2y∗
σ 2y∗+σ 2v +2σy∗t−1 ,v
y0t−1,
⎧
⎨
⎩
σ 2y∗
⎛
⎝1 −
(
λσ 2y∗
(
σ 2y∗ ∗
(
σ 2y∗+σ 2v +2σy∗t−1 ,v
)).5
)2⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ .
The result in Proposition 2 follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Under our assumptions
[
y∗t
y∗t−1
]
∼ N
[[
0
0
]
,
∑
6
]
where
∑
6
=
[
σ 2y∗ λσ
2
y∗
λσ 2y∗ σ
2
y∗
]
.
Following the earlier proof we can show that
[
yt
yt−1
]
∼ N
[[
0
0
]
,
∑
7
]
where
∑
7
=
[
σ 2y∗ + σ 2 λσ 2y∗ + σuv
λσ 2y∗ + σuv σ 2y∗ + σ 2
]
.
The result of Proposition 3 follows from the properties of conditional normal
distributions and our definition of s.
Appendix 2: The equilibrium distribution of the intergenerational model
The intergenerational model is described by Eqs. 1 and 2, repeated here for conve-
nience:
y∗t = βy∗t−1 + γ bt + eyt ,
bt = ρb t−1 + ebt ,
where eyt and ebt are iid with mean zero and variance σ
2
ey and σ
2
eb , respectively. We
assume that 0 < β < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1. We can establish the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Solution to the Intergenerational Model:
⎡
⎣
y∗t
y∗t−1
bt
⎤
⎦ ∼ N
⎡
⎣
⎡
⎣
0
0
0
⎤
⎦ , 
⎤
⎦ ,
where  =
⎡
⎢⎢
⎣
γ 2 11−ρ2
1
1−β2
[
1+βρ
1−βρ
]
σ 2eb + 11−β2 σ 2ey γ 2 11−ρ2 11−β2
[
ρ+β
1−βρ
]
σ 2eb + β1−β2 σ 2ey γ(1−ρ2)(1−βρ)σ 2eb
γ 2 11−ρ2
1
1−β2
[
ρ+β
1−βρ
]
σ 2eb + β1−β2 σ 2ey γ 2 11−ρ2 11−β2
[
1+βρ
1−βρ
]
σ 2eb + 11−β2 σ 2ey γρ 11−ρ2 11−βρ σ 2eb
γ
(1−ρ2)(1−βρ)σ
2
eb γρ
1
1−ρ2
1
1−βρ σ
2
eb
1
1−ρ2 σ
2
eb
⎤
⎥⎥
⎦.
Proof Available upon request. unionsq
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Appendix 3:
Table A1 Quartile Group Transition Matrices under alternative error structures (λ = 0.3)
No error
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.380 0.273 0.210 0.137
0.273 0.268 0.250 0.210
0.210 0.250 0.268 0.273
0.137 0.210 0.273 0.380
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Classical error
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.340 0.268 0.224 0.168
0.268 0.260 0.248 0.224
0.224 0.248 0.260 0.268
0.168 0.224 0.268 0.340
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.361 0.271 0.216 0.151
0.271 0.264 0.249 0.216
0.216 0.249 0.264 0.271
0.151 0.216 0.271 0.361
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Correlated error
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.350 0.269 0.221 0.161
0.269 0.262 0.249 0.221
0.221 0.249 0.262 0.269
0.161 0.221 0.269 0.350
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability Ratio(s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.369 0.272 0.214 0.146
0.272 0.265 0.249 0.214
0.214 0.249 0.265 0.272
0.146 0.214 0.272 0.369
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Simultaneous noncorrelated error (ρuv = 0)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.313 0.263 0.232 0.191
0.263 0.256 0.248 0.232
0.232 0.248 0.256 0.263
0.191 0.232 0.263 0.313
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.346 0.269 0.222 0.164
0.269 0.261 0.248 0.222
0.222 0.248 0.261 0.269
0.164 0.222 0.269 0.346
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Simultaneous correlated error (ρuv = 0.4)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.405 0.275 0.201 0.120
0.275 0.273 0.251 0.201
0.201 0.251 0.273 0.275
0.120 0.201 0.275 0.405
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.392 0.274 0.205 0.128
0.274 0.270 0.250 0.205
0.205 0.250 0.270 0.274
0.128 0.205 0.274 0.392
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Simultaneous correlated error (ρuv = 0.8)
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.5⎡
⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
0.509 0.278 0.156 0.058
0.278 0.306 0.261 0.156
0.156 0.261 0.306 0.278
0.058 0.156 0.278 0.509
⎤
⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
Reliability ratio (s) = 0.75
⎡
⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
0.442 0.278 0.186 0.095
0.278 0.283 0.254 0.186
0.186 0.254 0.283 0.278
0.095 0.186 0.278 0.442
⎤
⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
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Table A2 Aggregate mobility measures under alternative error structures (λ = 0.3)
Reliability ratio=0.5 Reliability ratio=0.75
IM B L IM B L
No error 0.324 0.341 0.740 0.324 0.342 0.740
Classical error 0.300 0.364 0.817 0.312 0.352 0.776
Non-classical error 0.306 0.359 0.799 0.317 0.348 0.762
Simultaneous error(ρuv = 0) 0.284 0.380 0.871 0.303 0.361 0.806
Simultaneous error(ρuv = 0.4) 0.339 0.327 0.696 0.331 0.334 0.718
Simultaneous error(ρuv = 0.8) 0.407 0.269 0.515 0.362 0.306 0.629
Table A3 Transition matrices with omitted variables (β=0.3, γ =0.3, ρ=0.5)
Truth, conditional⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.390 0.272 0.205 0.130
0.272 0.266 0.247 0.205
0.205 0.247 0.266 0.272
0.130 0.205 0.272 0.390
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Misspecified, unconditional⎡
⎢⎢⎢
⎢⎢⎢
⎣
0.408 0.274 0.199 0.117
0.274 0.270 0.248 0.199
0.199 0.248 0.270 0.274
0.117 0.199 0.274 0.408
⎤
⎥⎥⎥
⎥⎥⎥
⎦
Table A4 Aggregate mobility measures with omitted variables (β=0.3, γ =0.3, ρ=0.5)
IM B L
True, conditional model 0.328 0.333 0.722
Misspecified, unconditional model 0.339 0.323 0.690
Appendix 4: Equivalence of measurement error in fathers’ and sons’ earnings
fy∗t yt−1
(
QS∗i−1 ≤ y∗t < QS∗i | QFi−1 ≤ yt−1 < QFi
)
,
= 4
∫ QFi
QFi−1
∫ QS∗i
QS∗i−1
fy∗t yt−1 (x, z) dxdz.
Using the fact that fyt y∗t−1 (x, z) = fy∗t yt−1(z, x) and QSi = QFi and QS∗i = QF∗i we
can rewrite this as
= 4
∫ QF∗i
QF∗i−1
∫ QSi
QSi−1
fyt y∗t−1 (z, x) dzdx,
= fyt y∗t−1
(
QSi−1 ≤ yt < QSi | QF∗i−1 ≤ y∗t−1 < QF∗i
)
.
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